Berardo, Ramiro, and John T. Scholz. 2010. "Micro-incentives and the Dynamics of Policy Networks." American Journal of Political Science (Forthcoming, July).

Policy actors seek network contacts to improve individual payoffs in the institutional collective action dilemmas endemic to fragmented policy arenas. The Risk Hypothesis argues that actors seek bridging relationships (well-connected, popular partners that maximize their access to information) when cooperation involves low risks, but seek bonding relationships (transitive, reciprocal relationships that maximize credibility) when risks of defection increase. We test this hypothesis in newly developing policy arenas expected to favor relationships that resolve low-risk dilemmas. A stochastic actor-based model for network evolution estimated with survey data from 1999 and 2001 in 10 U.S. estuaries finds that actors do tend to select popular actors as partners, which presumably creates a centralized bridging structure capable of efficient information transmission for coordinating policies even without any government mandate. Actors also seek reciprocal bonding relationships supportive of small joint projects and quickly learn whether or not to trust their partners.

Berardo, Ramiro. 2009. "Processing Complexity in Networks: A Study of Informal Collaboration and its effect on Organizational Success." Policy Studies Journal. 37(3):521-539. [link]

Do organizations with more collaborative partners perform better than organizations with fewer partners? And is this relationship conditional on the ability of those partners to provide non-redundant resources from their network of contact with other actors? This article answers these questions with data describing the participation of governmental and non-governmental organizations in the Cooperative Funding Initiative (CFI), a program sponsored by the one of the five water management districts in Florida. Results show a positive relationship between the inclusion of more partners in a project and the chances of getting funded, but also that once the project becomes too inclusive, those chances decrease if the partners fill more structural holes (e.g. provide more non-redundant resources). In other words, organizations perform better by adding more partners as long as this addition does not result in excessive complexity. These results are valuable for the growing community of policy scholars seeking to understand the specific conditions under which collaborative behavior positively affects organizational performance.

Berardo, Ramiro. 2009. "Generalized Trust in Multi-organizational Policy Arenas: Studying its Emergence from a Network Perspective." Forthcoming in Political Research Quarterly. [link]

This study tests hypotheses linking the structural characteristics of policy networks to the feelings of trust of their members. A social capital perspective suggests that actors in denser networks should trust others more, while an alternative "centrality " approach suggests that trust may be a byproduct of the occupation of key positions in the group. The author tests these expectations with data mapping policy networks in twenty-two estuaries in the United States and finds that centrality is a better predictor of trust. This opens room for questioning the real value of trust as a necessary ingredient in the solution of collective action dilemmas.

Berardo, Ramiro. 2009. "Sustaining Joint Ventures: The Role of Resource Exchange and the Strength of Inter-organizational Relationships.” In Feiock, Richard, and John Scholz (Editors). Self-Organizing Federalism: Collaborative Mechanisms to Mitigate Institutional Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 204-228. [link]

Main findings: This paper analyses information collected on 41 water-related projects in Southwest Florida. Findings show that stakeholders manifest a higher likelihood to continue collaborating with their partners when they receive assistance in increasing the public and political support for the projects AND when their interactions are stronger in terms of frequency. A copy of the survey used in this study is available here. A list of Organizations that participated in the study is contained here.

Scholz, John T., Ramiro Berardo, and Brad Kile. 2008. "Do Networks Solve Collective Action Problems? Credibility, Search, and Collaboration." Journal of Politics 70(2): 393-406. [download]

Using data from 22 U.S. estuaries, we analyzed the role of networks in facilitating collaborative activities among agencies.  We found that collaboration does not require perceived agreement; agencies with greater diversity in their networks recognized more disagreements, but still collaborated more than agencies with clustered networks of more like-minded associates. Also, agencies that tended to play central roles in networks were the most likely to be involved in multiple collaborative activities.

Scholz, John T. and Cheng-Lung Wang. 2006. "Cooptation or Transformation? Local Policy Networks and Federal Regulatory Enforcement." American Journal of Political Science 50(1): 81-97. [download]

Our study of Clean Water permits found both tougher enforcement and more compliance in watersheds with active policy networks and local partnerships.  These networks transform local policy interests by galvanizing the combined efforts of those concerned and affected by water pollution, resulting in more enforcement and compliance even in conservative areas generally opposed to government regulation.

Scholz, John and Bruce Stiftel, editors. 2005. Adaptive Governance and WaterConflicts. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. [link]

This book investigates new types of water conflicts among users in the seemingly water-rich Eastern United States. Eight case studies were chosen to span the range of conflicts crossing fragmented regulatory boundaries. Each begins with a history of the conflict and then focuses on the institutional arrangements that evolved to grapple with the resulting challenges. In the chapters that follow, scholars and practitioners offer different theoretical and experience- based perspectives on the cases. Together, they discuss five challenges that new institutions must overcome to develop sustainable solutions for water users: Who is to be involved in the policy process? How are they to interact? How is science to be used? How are users and the public to be educated? How can solutions be made efficient and equitable? This book is a valuable tool for water professionals, policy scientists, students, and scholars in natural resource planning and management.

Schneider, Mark, Mark Lubell, John T. Scholz, Denisa Midruta, and Matt Edwards. 2003. “Building Consensual Institutions: Networks and the National Estuary Program ” American Journal of Political Science 47:143-158. [download].

The National Estuary Program provided resources that allowed 28 selected estuaries to develop comprehensive planning to integrate watershed policies.  This study compared the policy networks in 12 of these estuaries with 10 similar estuaries, and found that NEP estuaries generally had larger more extensive networks of shareholders.  The networks spanned many boundaries between different levels of government, and between government, stakeholders, and the research community.  These more-developed policy networks are associated with stronger beliefs that the policy process in the estuary is fair, that stakeholders interests are adequately interested, and that conflicts can be resolved within the estuary.  The authors discuss how the NEP stimulated the expansion of policy networks, and speculate about the implications.

Lubell, Mark, John Scholz, Mark Schneider, and Mihriye Mete. 2002. “Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions” American Journal of Political Science 46: 148-163. [download]

Watershed partnerships have been formed to coordinate and plan watershed policies in some, but not all watersheds in the U.S.  This study found that they were more likely to develop when the pollution problems facing the watershed were most severe and where other governmental agencies were not as active in tackling these problems. They also emerged in areas where the costs of organizing were less because of higher social capital (higher income, education levels), particularly when other planning organizations had existed prior to the partnership.

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